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SOURCE Nowe Drogi, Vol VII, No 3 (45).

EIGHTH PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF POLISH UNITED WORKERS PARTY

[Comment: The Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, Polish United Workers Party), held on 28 March 1953 in Warsaw, scored ideological errors, especially the inadequate appreciation of international Communism as the only means to achieve national well-being and independence. In contrast with the Seventh Plenum, which blamed some plan failures on material difficulties and made concrete recommendations for a better distribution of commodities and facilities to promote worker incentives [redacted], speakers at the Eighth Plenum denied that material difficulties were at the root of economic failures.

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The PZPR appears to have failed in its mission of wiping out nationalist feelings among workers, among Polish youth, and even among its own members, and is now making a valiant attempt to defend itself with copious historical allusions to prove a praiseworthy tradition. The PZPR seems to be facing an urgent necessity to justify its existence to Soviet masters, and betrays the fact that Communists are having serious difficulties in countering disinclination toward the USSR inside Poland. The prominent place given to Minister of Public Security Radkiewicz's speech (in Nowe Drogi he is given 8 pages, the largest amount of space after Bierut), the references to expulsions from the party, the general criticism of the party members, and the references to Gomulka and Spychalski, may indicate that not only is a thorough overhauling of the party membership likely to continue for the coming year, but that the stage may be set, finally, for the trial of Gomulka and Spychalski, after sufficient purity is demonstrated for casting the first stone.

Summary: Bierut's opening address, entitled "The Immortal Teachings of Comrade Stalin as a Weapon in the Struggle for Continued Strengthening of the Party and the National Front," developed the theme of internationalism versus nationalism, as exemplified historically in Stalin's speeches and in the development of the various

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prewar Polish Communist and socialist parties. At the close of the session, the Eighth Plenum unanimously resolved to adopt Bierut's speech as the guiding principle for the work of the entire party. The following is a brief summary of Bierut's speech, and the points emphasized by other speakers.⁷

Bierut's Speech

Stalin's exceptional sense of international humanism enabled him to show the Communist parties that they had a common goal in the support of all revolutionary movements against the imperialistic oppression of the working classes. The prewar KPP (Komunistyczna Partia Polska, Polish Communist Party) fought against Pilsudski's pseudonationalism which, motivated by hatred of the USSR, supported Hitler. However, during that period it turned out that the leadership of the party was seriously threatened by masked agents of the enemy, who managed to penetrate gradually to the most important links in the leadership of the KPP apparatus, just as, in the postwar period, entire nests of disguised agents provocateurs and spies were discovered in various countries under their respective overlords -- Tito in Yugoslavia, Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria, Slansky in Czechoslovakia, and Spychalski in Poland. Thus, the Comintern was forced to disband the KPP, but after Hitler attacked Poland, the true Communists broke out of the Sanacja jails and assumed leadership of the masses in the fight against fascism.

In 1939, when Poland proved defenseless against Hitler's armies, the USSR offered protection to the present western Ukraine and Belorussia by annexing them. For Poland, the lands had only constituted elements of weakness, not strength as in the case of the former Polish lands on the Oder, Neisse, and Baltic, justly recovered from Germany.

Poland's wrong choice of an alliance had led to invasion by Hitler. The alliance with the USSR will guarantee Poland's independence. During and immediately after World War II, the USSR hastened to Poland's aid with military equipment, food, prefabricated housing, technical assistance, etc.

Since Stalin's death, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has passed to the most faithful disciples of Lenin and the best co-warriors of Stalin. The PZPR must be worthy of the legacy of ideas and teachings of Lenin and Stalin. To do this it must purge itself of all vacillating, ideologically foreign, opportunistic, and bourgeois elements. Only a disciplined, singleminded, monolithic organization can carry out the revolutionary mission of building a new society. Only those free of bourgeois traits -- bureaucracy, passivity, officiousness, perfunctoriness, favoritism, provincialism, and drunkenness -- can be in the vanguard to show the masses the way to achieve the goal of economic and social transformation of Poland as outlined in the Six-Year Plan.

Now is the time to prepare for the coming fall elections to the people's councils, the basic links in the people's authority.

The most important and urgent tasks before the party are:

1. To strengthen the party by accepting new replacements from among the best and most selfless workers, peasants, and working intellectuals
2. To fight for the purity of party ranks.
3. To deepen the political awareness of each party member.
4. To relate practical party work to Marxist-Leninist theory at every step.

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5. To strengthen the worker-peasant alliance, to improve party contacts with mass organizations, and to improve the direction of these organizations by party echelons.
6. To mobilize the working masses to fulfill production plans in town and country.
7. To fight bureaucracy and willfulness, and to improve control over the execution of the decisions of the party and government.
8. To strengthen the people's state and armed forces, and to give prime attention to the Polish Army and security organs.
9. To do everything to strengthen the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism.
10. To guard faithfully the brotherly friendship of the USSR.

Other Speakers

Wiktor Klosiewicz, chairman of the CRZZ (Centralna Rada Związkow Zawodowych, Central Council of Trade Unions), affirmed the correctness of the PZPR Central Committee's charge that the causes for plan failures are to be found not in objective difficulties but rather in poor political work and poor work organization in the enterprises.

Wladyslaw Kruczek, first secretary of the Bydgoszcz Wojewodztwo Committee of the PZPR, reiterated the necessity of fighting corruption in party ranks but pointed to the progress made in accepting new members into the party.

Franciszek Jozwiak-Witold, chairman of the Central Control Commission of the PZPR, analyzed figures on the expulsion of unfit members in 1952 and warned against enemy penetration of party ranks.

Jozef Kalinowski, first secretary of the Lublin Wojewodztwo Committee of the PZPR, gave a report on the collectivization drive in Lublin Wojewodztwo.

Tadeusz Daniszewski, manager of the History Division of the PZPR, discussed the influence of Stalin in the ideological development of KPP.

Jozef Olszewski, first secretary of the Stalinogrod Wojewodztwo Committee of the PZPR, pointed out that much political indoctrination is still needed to safeguard economic plans, particularly in coal production.

Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security, pointed to the example of Czechoslovakia's smashing of the agency of Slansky. In Poland the neutralization of such political diversionists as Spychalski and the exposure of the treacherous work of Komar and company constituted stages in Poland's struggle with the class enemy and were blows dealt by the party against enemy imperialist penetration. Radkiewicz also scored the laxness and stupidity apparent in many party organizations, and said vigilance was needed on the part of the masses of workers to avert minor acts of sabotage.

Tadeusz Wegner, secretary of the Main Administration of the ZMP (Związek Młodzieży Polskiej, Union of Polish Youth), cited failures in the indoctrination of youth and called for improved methods of work among young people to counter-act enemy propaganda.

Jerzy Tepicht, director of the Instytut Ekonomiki Rolnej (Institute of Agricultural Economics), contrasted Stalin's concept of the solidarity and common

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interest of all worker classes in the world with the nationalist ideology of Kautsky, Gomułka, and the Social Democrats. He stated that Stalin's true concept of the nation in an alliance of equal nations must be better understood for progress toward true independence, rather than retrogression toward domination by Western imperialism.

Roman Werfel, editor in chief of Nowe Drogi, summarized the importance of the ideological front in the deeper transformation of the PZPR into a party of the Leninist-Stalinist type, and called for wider dissemination of Stalin's works on internationalism.

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